Changes between Initial Version and Version 1 of Ticket #749


Ignore:
Timestamp:
2018-10-13T20:40:52Z (6 years ago)
Author:
Jakub Jermář
Comment:

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  • Ticket #749

    • Property Summary Map and eradicate use of kernel addresses as IDs for userspace → Map and eradicate uses of kernel addresses as IDs for userspace

  • Ticket #749 – Description

    initial v1  
    77  1. leaking addresses of kernel objects represents a security risk and
    88  1. kernel addresses use a global namespace (unlike task-local capability handles), so this precludes some light forms of virtualisation on the namespace-level
     9
     10The following list enumerates the individual cases:
     11
     12  * `ipc_forward` sets phone_t *newphone in call->data.phone
     13  * `ipc_forward` sets TASK->taskid (another global ID) in call->data.task_id
     14  * `_ipc_call_actions_internal` sets phone_t *phone in call->data.phone
     15  * '_ipc_call_actions_internal` sets caller->task_id in call->data.task_id
     16  * `sys_ipc_wait_for_call` sets call->priv in call->data.phone
     17  * `event_enqueue` sets TASK->taskid in call->data.task_id
     18  * `_ipc_answer_free_call` sets TASK->taskid in call->data.task_id